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Abstract. This article identifies several psychological Issues bearing on the latest ballistic missile defense 
policies of the United States Government. 
 
Journalists suggest that the United States Government (USG) intends to move ever more quickly to 
develop a ballistic missile defense and to abandon or fundamentally alter the 1972 Antiballistic Missile 
Treaty. If the journalists are correct, political psychologists might note several psychological Issues 
bearing on the USG policy direction. 
 
First, the USG now seems to have a goal of complicating "'a prospective opponent's calculation of 
success, adding to his uncertainty and weakening his confidence'" and not "an air-tight defense against 
even a small attack." Given that the opponent is primarily a leader or leaders of a rogue nation who may 
demonstrate very different sorts of logic, rationality, and belief systems from those of the leaders of the 
USG, complicating the deliberations of that opponent may have little to do with the viability of a ballistic 
missile defense. Plus how one complicates motivation for an accidental launch is certainly food for 
epistemological and metaphysical analysis. 
 
Second, the European allies of the USG seem prepared to go along with the USG policy direction--
however grudgingly--if the USG consults first them. However, USG public announcements suggest that 
the direction and a number of its parameters are non-negotiable. Thus, to obtain European support, the 
USG might wish to consult the psychological research on inducing perceptions of empowerment, 
involvement, and procedural justice. 
 
Third is the Issue of trust. The USG seems ready to reduce its number of nuclear warheads in 
conjunction with developing and fielding a ballistic missile defense. But what can be reduced also can be 
increased at a later time. The USG states that the rationale for a missile defense involves rogue nations, 
accidental launches, and terrorist threats. But what appears necessary to complicate matters in these 
situations also may serve to complicate matters for other nuclear adversaries who adhere to a 
deterrence concept based on calculations of comparative offensive and defensive capabilities. 
Moreover, some supporters and staffers of USG authorities seem to suggest that ballistic missile 
defense may even be secondary to abrogating or violating the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. How one 
engenders perceptions of trust, however, is still too much a nomothetic than an idiographic proposition 
in the psychological literature. 
 
As with constructs like deterrence, massive retaliation, parity, and mutually assured destruction, the 
essence of nuclear weapons policies are permeated with psychological phenomena--a tremendous 
opportunity for political psychologists to make a difference. (See Cascardi, M., Poythress, N. G., & Hall, 
A. (2000). Procedural justice in the context of civil commitment: An analogue study. Behavioral Sciences 
& the Law, 18, 731-740; Gordon, M.R., & Myers, S.L. (April 30, 2001). Bush team vows to speed up work 
on missile shield. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Hamilton, V.L. (2000). (In)Justice in 
waiting: Russian officers' organizational commitment and mental distress during downsizing. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 30, 1995-2027; Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). 
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Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108, 291-310; 
Sniezek, J. A., & Van Swol, L, M. (2001). Trust, confidence, and expertise in a judge-advisor system. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84, 288-307.) (Keywords: Antiballistic Missile 
Treaty, Ballistic Missile Defense.) 
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